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1. Summary. CA4 has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, providing that 
11 [a]ll persons ••• shall have the same right .•• to make and 
enforce contracts ••• as is enjoyed by white persons," prohibits 
- discrimination against non-white persons in private contractual 
relationships. On the strength of that interpretation it has -- ---~-- ,_, 
-
affirmed an award of monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief 
to two black families whose applications for admission to private 
schools were rejected because of their race. The Southern 
Independent School Association (SISA), a "substantial proportion" 
of whose members deny admission to black applicants, intervened as 
a defendant and was also enjoined from further adherence to that 
policy. SISA (in No. 75-278) and the individual schools (in Nos. 
75-62 and 75-66) have separately ~etitioned for review. The two 
(in Noo 75-306) 
black families have cross-petitioned, challenging the dismissal 
I\ 
of one of their damage claims on statute of limitations grounds, 






2. Facts. The individual schools are Bobbe's School, of 
which petr Katheryne Runyon was the founder, and Fairfax-Brewster 
School. They both began operations shortly after this Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Each has grown to an enrollment of about 200 students. Each 
operates a summer day camp attended by ma:iy of its wintertime 
students. Neither has ever had a black child in either program. 
Neither has ever received any federal, state, or local aid. 
The encounter of the Gonzales family with the schools occurred 
in 1969. Responding to an advertisement in the yellow pages, 
Gonzales 
Mr. and Mrs. /vis·ited Fairfax-Brewtser and then filed an application 
for the admission of their son, Colin, to the summer day camp. 
Their hope was that he would also be enrolled as a student in the 
fall. The application was denied without explanation. Mr. 
Gonzales claims that he called the school to ask for an explanation 
and was told "we are not integrated," though the school employees 
with whom he claims t o have spoken deny this. Their version is 
that Colin was not qualified for admission as a student, and that 
have been 
it would/unfair to take him at the camp and then require him to 
withdraw at the beginning of the school year. They deny that either 
the camp or the school has a policy of racial discrimination. 
...... ------------------------------:-------------Mr. Gonzales thereafter telephoned Bobbe's School and was 
told in answer to his inquiry that only white applicants would be 
accepted. He filed no formal application with Bobbe' School. 
The McCrarys made their attempt in 1972. Mrs. Mccrary claims 
to have telephoned Bobbe's School and been told, in answer to her 





Bobbe's School employees deny ever having told either Mccrary 
or Gonzales that they excluded black children, as they deny having 
any such policy in fact. 
In 1973 the McCrarys and Gonzaleses sued in ED Va (Bryan) 
on behalf of themselves, their children, and those similarly 
~/ situated,*for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, 
~
hey relied exclusively on§ 1981. The defendant schools denied 
the 
 that/children had been rejected because of their race. SISA, 
as intervening defendant, admitted that its members excluded black 
students, but claimed that this entirely private conduct was not 
reached by§ 1981. The DC found the testimony of the schools' 
witnesses "unbelievable," and determined that the plaintiffs' efforts 
·- had been rebuffed because of race. Formal applications, of which 
there were none to Bobbe's School, were unnecessary, since they 
would clearly have been futile. The DC then held that the 
discrimination of which the individual schools had been found 
guilty, and to which SISA confessed, was prohibited by§ 1981. 
Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), dictated that that 
section, like§ 1982(granting all persons the same rights as white 
citizens to buy and sell property), was to be read literally and 
-
as prohibiting all racial discrimination public and private. 
Compensatory damages for "humiliation and mental anguish" were 
awarded against the individual schools. They and SISA were 
permanently enjoined from discriminating on the basis of race, and 
such discrimination was declared violative of§ 1981. Attorney's 
fees were also awarded against the individual schools ($1000 each). 
*·' The plaintiff class was disallowed, and no review is sought 
OT that determination. · 
::, . - -
- Punitive damages were denied, as was a recovery by Mr. and Mrs. 
Gonzales. Their claim was held barred by the applicable Virginia 
statute of limitations of two years for personal injury actions. 
More than that time had expired since their 1969 applications, 
although theirson's recovery was to be allowed because of his 
minority. 
Judge Haynsworth, joined by Judges Winter, 3. Decision below. 
~-,v4~ 
Butzner, and Rlz.eeeil, upheld the DC's finding of a§ 1981 violation. 
Its finding that the Mccrary and Gonzales children had been excluded 
nltJ'_ ~ on r acial grounds was not clearly erroneous, and its holding that 
(~~81 is "a limitation upon private discrimination" was compelled 
by Jones v. Mayer Co. The correctness of the latter decision was 
thought by Judge Haynsworth to be "debatable," but it had been ·-
-
reaffirmed twice by this Court, Sullivan Vo Little Hunting Park, 
Inc. -, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Tillman v. Wheaton -Haven Recreational --
( J /fc.~ 
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), and what it held for§ 1982 must '-#Bl~:klfW• 
necessarily apply to§ 1981 as well. The two provisions were both ti~ 
derived from Section One of the Civil Rights A~t of 1866, a~d the 
close relation between them had been expressly noted by this Court 
in Tillman. 410 U.S. at 439-40. It was clear, moveover, that the -
school-pupil relationship that these applicants had been prevented 
from entering into was a contractual one. Nor could the schools 
defend on the ground that admission was not open to all white 
people but only those who were qualified. Since these applicants 
were qualified, they were denied the contractual right of admission 
because they were black, and that was sufficient to establish a 
violation of the statute. 
-
u. - -
Judge Haynsworth then addressed several constitutional 
challenges to the statute as interpreted and applied. (1) NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S . 449 (1958), made ·clear that there was a 
constitutionally protected "freedom to engage in association for 
the advancement of beliefs and ideas," id. at 460, but there was 
no showing here that the black applicants did not share the 
schools' beliefs and ideas, or that their advancement would in 
any way be impeded by the discontinuance of discrimination in 
admissions. (2) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), 
suggested the existence of a constitutional right to send one's 
child to a private school featuring the "curriculum and dogma" 
of one's choice. Parents remain free to do so, but the schools 
themselves may not discriminate on the basis of race. (3) As for 
·- the right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a school that "holds 
v 
-
itself open to the public" is "far from the realm of protection." -
§ 1981 does not prohibit all private associationso As construed 
in Sullivan and Tillman, it does prevent an association from 
having a "plan or purpose of exclusiveness" other than race. It is 
{ only when blacks are"denied a right to contract which would be 
l granted were they white, [that]§ 1981 is violated." 
Judge Haynsworth was not troubled by certain dicta in Norwood 
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), suggesting racial discrimination 
be 
by private schools may not itself/prohibited. The Court in that 
case struck down the provision by Mississippi of tex tbooks to 




I • - -
That the Con~itution may compel toleration of private discrimi-
nation in some circumstances does not mean that it requires s 
state support for such discrimination. 
Id. at 463. This was dictum, and Norwood in any event elsewhere 
recognized that private discrimination is "subject to special 
remedial le3islation in certain cir cumstances under§ 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment." Id. at 470. This was one such circumstance. 
In the last paragraph of his discussion of§ 1981 Judge 
Haynsworth put this limitation on it: There might be schools 
that were "so private as to have a discernible rule of -exclusivity which is inoffensive to§ 1981." Such would be the case 
if a family hired a tutor to school its children, and excluded 
the rest of the world on the basis of lack of family relation. 
But the schools in this case were not private in that sense. 
Indeed they were "more public than private." They appealed to 
a general constituency, and even used public advertisement to 
reach it. "Within that constituency," they were not to be allowed 
to pick and choose on the basis of race. 
the 
Turning to/damages question, Judge Haynsworth upheld the 
recovery for "embarrasment, humiliation and mental anguish" on 
the authority of Sullivan, which held that compensatory damages 
could be had for violations of§ 1982 and that "federal and state 
rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the 
policies expressed in the federal statutes." Embarrasment and 
humiliation were the "natural consequences" of a violation of 






Attorney's fees were not to be allowed, however. This was 
a "novel application of a recently revived statute," and the 
schools had not shm,m_ "obdurate obstinacy" ( CA4' s test for a 
punitive fee award) in resisting it. There was no statutory 
provision of attorney's fees. A "private attorney general" 
theory was also rejected, for reasons that seem unimportant in 
light of this Court's intervening decision in Alyeska Pipelineo 
Judge Haynsworth lost the support of Judges Butzner, Winter 
and Craven on this last point. They would have awarded attorney's 
fees alternatively on a "private attorney general" theory or on 
a finding of "obstinate obduracy," the latter being based on the 
school employees' failure to testify truthfully about their reasons 
for rejecting the plaintifCs ' applications. 
Judges Russell, Field and Widener joined in the reversal of 
the _attorney's fees award, but would also have held§ 1981 
inapplicable. They distinguished§ 1982 and Jones on the ground 
that a real estate sale was a "commercial transaction pure and 
simp}-e," whereas the student-te2.cher relationship was "one of status," 
to which contractual aspects were "minor and inciden1,al. 11 They 
argued that the majority's interpretation of the statute raised 
a serious question of interference with the rights of privacy and 
free association. They suggested that if§ 1981 is to be applied 
to private contractual relationships, a distinction be drawn between 
"primary relationships," or those characterized by "intimate 
association," and "secondary relationships," or those of a corrnnercial 
nature. In their view§ 1981 should only reach the latter, and 
should therefore not prohibit racial discrimination by a small 
- 9. -
- private school. 
-
-
4. Contentions. Among them, the schools and SISA make the 
following contentions: 
(a) Unlike the right to own property, at issue in Jones, 
the freedom to contract- -or at least to contract for attendance at 
the private school of your choice--was not one of the "great 
fundamental civil rights" sought to be extended to blacks by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 . 
(b) The right to be free of racial discrimination in 
private school admissions (the right to "compulsory admission'; 
as SISA would have it) was not one of the rights that even white 
people enjoyed before the enactment of 1981. 
(c) Since exclusion from some private schools was not 
one of the "badges and incidents of slavery," construing§ 1981 
as an attempt to eliminate such exclusion places it beyond 
r l • Congress s power under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
(d) As construed by CA4, 1981 infringes the constitutional 
right of free association recognized in NAACP v. Alabama, and 
again in Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 173, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting), and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 
575 (1974). 
(e) As construed by CA4, 1981 infringes the constitutional 
right of privacy recognized in Roe and Griswold, .•• 
(f) .•• as well as the parental right to direct the 
education of children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
(g) As construed,the statute is unconstitutionally 




(h) Unlike the a ss ocia tions considered in Sullivan and 
Tillman, the schools have a non- r acial "plan or purpose of 
exclusiveness," and are not "open to every white person within the 
geographical area, there being no selective element other than 
race." 
(i) A distinction should be drawn, as CA4's dissenters 
propose, between commercial contractual relations and those 
involving "status" or intimate personal associations, admissions 
to private elementary schools being in the latter category . 
Petr Fairfax-Brewster, sued by the Gonzaleses only, 
claims that the case is moot, at least insofar as the permanent 
injunction is concerned, · the Gonzaleses having moved out of the 
e county and enrolled their son elsewhere. 
-
. The McCrarys-and Gonzaleses have filed a single response to 
all three petns of the schools and SISA. In it they simply rely on 
the CA4 majority opinion. Their separate cross-petition challenges 
the barring of the Gonzales parents' claim on statute of limitations 
grounds and the disallowance of attorney's fees. On the former 
point it is argued that the Virginia limitations period for claims for 
"personal injuries," which the lower courts applied, is properly 
applicable only to bodily injury _cases, and that this action belongs 
of "personal actions," 
in Virginia's "catchall" category . for which there is a limitations 
/ \ 
period of five years. It is true that the five-year period applies 
only if the action would survive the death of the plaintiff, and 
that this action would not do so under Virgina law. But the 
vindication of important federal rights is not to be circwnscribed 
-
- -
by outmoded state survival rules. As for attorney's fees, cross-
petrs rely on the DC's finding that various school officials had 
lied on the stand. By this attempted use of perjury to deny 
cross-petrs their civil rights "the very temple of justice has 
been defiled." 
Fairfax-Brewster has responded to the cross-petn. On the 
statute of limitations point it quotes at length from a prior 
CA4 decision applying the two-year statute to a§ 1983 action. 
It c ites another decision in which the same result was reached and 
cert was denied by this Court. It closes by noting that in 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), this Court 
app l ied the one-year statute enacted by Tennessee for federal 
civil rights actions to an action under§ 1981. Fairfax-Brewster's 
- answer to the attorney's fees contention is that if they are 
awarded in this case, then any party whose version of the facts 
-
is not accepted becomes liable for the cost of the entire litigation. 
Each of the cases cited by cross-petrs is distinguished as involving 
far more aggravated degrees of misconduct by the losing party. 
5. Discussion. On the merits, it is difficult to fault 
CA4 in its application of Jones v. Mayer Co. That case has been 
twice reaffirmed by this Court in Sullivan and Tillman, and in the 
latter case it was said that "[i]n light of the historical inter-
relationship between§ 1981 and§ 1982, [there is] no reason to 
construe these sections differently,'' at least for purposes of 
determining whether a particular association is exempt from them 
under§ 2OOOa(e) as a private club. In Johnson v. Railway Express 
Co. the Court said in dicta that§ 1981 "affords a federal remedy 
LL. - -
4 against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race," 
thus apparently endorsing the view that§ 1981 is a generally 
applicable ban on discriminationo It would be difficult to 
distinguish these cases, though some might find it not as difficult 
as to believe that Congress in 1866 actually intended to prohibit 
all r acial discrimination in any private contractual relationship. 
~ I~ some limitatio~ 1981 's reach were sought, t~ follo~ng 
m~ght be the most promising avenues: -(1) The 1866 Civil Rights Act was intended (perhaps as a 
solely 
constitutional necessity) /to eliminate badges and incidents of 
slaveryo The test of its reach is therefore a historical one. 
Inability to buy and sell property was a diffibility peculiarly 
associated with slavery. Contractual discrimination of certain 
- "public" kinds also was, but discrimination by individual fellow 
citizens was not. {Which side of the line private education falls 
l'rohoJI U/ IAl-truld c.m'71~ ~At/Lr l'tl'/-t!.S/J~/:.lal',_ 




(2) Sullivan and Tillman suggest that§ 1981 may apply only -
to associations having "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness ~d] 
no sele-ctive element other than raceo" Private schools and some 
other associations tha t do not hold themselves open generally to the 
public are therefore not covered. (It is as yet unclear whether the 
quoted languag~ imply allows exclusion on other than racial grounds, 
o~ lusion on racial grounds by associations that are 
r--
otherwise exclusive. The ·former seems to be CA4's view, and of 
1 ____.,___ _ ____, 
course it limits§ 1981 hardly at all.) 
(3) § 1981 was indeed intended to be a universally applicable 
.. - 13. -
-e ban on racial discriminati on, but its application is limited by 
countervailing constitutional guarantees to privacy and freedom 
of association. (It seems unlikely that private schools, or very 
many other associations , could escape in this way.) 
-
-
CA4's result could of course s imply be accepted, as by a denial 
of cert. Its implications for contractual relations generally are 
very broad, but the importance of its holding in this case could 
be overestimated. The Brown-spawned private segregated schools 
(SISA purports• to represent over 300 schools) will not be desegregated 
by the decision, though t hey can expect a certain amount of litigation 
as a result of it. There is no circuit conflict, CA4 being the 
first to rule on the application of §~.1981 to private schools. 
In Riley Vo Adirondack School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 
1973), the DC (Hodges) held, relying on the Sullivan and Tillman 
dicta, that where race was a factor , but nct:the only factor causing 
rejection of a black applicant by a private school, the school 
was not one that had "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness o • • 
than race," and therefore had not violated§ 1981. Perhaps the 
case is <listing' uishable in that the DC here found that the 
; 
applicants were rejected because (and apparently solely because) 
they were black. An appeal from Riley is now pending before CA5 
en bane, though that court may be holding the case to await ---
disposition of these petns o 
There are responses. 
other 
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The principal issue presented by these consolidated 
cases is whether a federal law, namely 42 U. S. C. § 1981, 
prohibits private schools from excluding qualified chil-





RUNYON v. McCRARY 
I 
The respondents in No. 75-62, Michael McCrary and 
Colin Gonzales, are Negro children. By their parents, 
they filed a class action against the petitioners in No. 
75-62, Russell and Katheryne Runyon, who are the 
proprietors of Bobbe's Private School in Arlington, Va. 
Their complaint alleged that they had been prevented 
from attending th!=) school because of the petitioners' 
policy of denying admission to Negroes, in violation of 
42 U. S. C: § 1981 1 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq. '1: They sought de-
claratory and injuncfive relief and damages. On the 
same day another Negro child, Colin Gonzales, the re-
spondent in No. 75-66, filed a similar complaint by his 
parents against the petitioner in No. 75-66, Fairfax-
Brewster School, Inc., located in Fairfax County, Va. 
The petitioner in No. 75-278, the Southern Independent 
School Association, sought and was granted permission 
to intervene as a party defendant in the suit against the 
Runyons. That organization is a nonprofit association 
composed of six state private school associations, and 
represents 395 private schools. It is stipulated that 
many of these schools deny admission to Negroes. 
The suits were consolidated for trial. The findings of 
the District Court, which were left undisturbed by the 
Court of Appeals, were as follows. Bobbe's School 
1 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides : 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United Stat es shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, a.nd to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to 
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other." 
2 T.he respondents withdrew their Title II claim before t rial. 
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opened in 1958 and grew from an initial enrollment of 
five students to 200 in 1972. A day camp was begun 
in 1967 and has averaged 100 children per year. The 
Fairfax-Brewster School commenced operations in 1955, 
and opened a summer day camp in 1956. A total of 
223 students were enmlled at the school during the 1972-
1973 academic year, and 236 attended the day camp in 
the summer of 1972. Neither school has ever accepted 
a. Negro child for any of its programs. 
In response to a mailed brochure addressed "resident" 
and an advertisement in the "Yellow Pages" of the tele-
phone directory, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales telephoned and 
then visited the Fairfax-Brewster School in May 1969. 
After the visit, they submitted an application for Colin's 
admission to the day camp. The school responded with 
a, form letter, which stated that the school was "unable 
to accommodate [Colin's] application." Mr. Gonzales, 
telephoned the school. Fairfax-Brewster's Chairman of 
the Board explained that the reason for Colin's rejection 
was that the School was not integrated. Mr. Ganzales 
then telephoned Bobbe's School, from which the family 
had also received in the mail a brochure addressed to 
"resident." In response to a question concerning that 
school's admissions policies, he was told that only mem-
bers of the Caucasian race were accepted. In August 
1972, Mrs. McCrary telephone Bobbe's School in re-
sponse to an advertisement in the telephone book. She' 
inquired about nursery school facilities for her son, 
Michael. She also asked if the School was integrated. 
The answer was no. 
Upon these facts, the District Court found that the 
Fairfax-Brewster School had rejected Colin Gonzales'· 
application on account of his race and that Bobbe's 
School had denied both children admission on racial 
grounds. The Court hcld that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 makes; 
4 
75-62, et c.-OPINION 
RUNYON v. McCRARY 
illegal the schools' racially discriminatory admissions 
policies. It therefore enjoined Fairfax-Brewster an,d 
Bobbe's School and the member schools of the Southern 
Independent School Association 3 from discriminating 
against applicants for admission on the basis of race. 
The Court awarded compensatory relief to Mr. and Mrs. 
McCrary, Michael McCrary, and Colin Gonzales.4 In 
a previous ruling the Court had held that the damage 
claim of Mr. and Mrs.' Gonzales was barred by Virginia's 
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury 
actions, "borrowed" for § 1981 suits filed in that State. 
Finally, the Court assessed attorney's fees of $1 ,000 
a.gain.st each school. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster 
School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (ED Va. 1973). 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting 
en bane, affirmed the District Court's grant of equitable 
and compensatory relief and its ruling as to the appli-
cable statute of limitations, but reversed its award of 
attorney's fees. M cCrary v. Runyon, 515 F. 2d 1082 
(1975). Factually, the Court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
the two schools had discriminated racially against the 
children. On the basic issue of law, the Court agreed 
that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 is a "limitation upon private dis-
crimination, and its enforcement in the context of this 
case is not a deprivation of any right of free association 
or of privacy of the defendants, of the inter.venor, or 
their pupils or patrons." Id ., at 1086., The relationship 
the parents had sought to enter into with the schools was 
3 The District Court determined that the suit could not be main-
tained as a class action. 
4 For the embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish which 
the parents and children suffered, the Court awarded Colin Gonzales 
$2,000 against the Fairfa.x-Brewster School and $500 against Bobbe's 
School. Michael McCra.ry was awarded damages of $1,000, and 
Mr. and Mrs. McCray $2,000, against Bobbe's School 
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in the Court's view undeniably contractual in nature, 
within the meaning of § 1981, and the Court rejected the 
schools' claim that § 1981 confers no right of action 
unless the contractual relationship denied to Negroes is 
available to all whites. Id. , at 1087. Finally, the appel-
late court rejected the schools' contention that their ra-
cially discriminatory policies are protected by any consti-
tutional right of privacy. "When a school holds itself 
open to the public ... or even to those applicants meet-
ing established qualifications, there is no perceived pri-
vacy of the sort that has been given constitutional 
protection." Id., at 1088. 
We granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the 
Fairfax-Brewster School, No. 75-66, Bobbe's School, No. 
75-62, and the Southern Independent School Associa-
tion, No. 75-278, to consider whether 42 U. S. C. § 1981 
prevents private schools from discriminating racially 
among applicants. - U. S. - (1975). We also 
granted the cross-petition of Michael McCrary, Colin 
Gonzales, and their parents, No. 75-306, to determine 
the attorney's fees and statute of limitatioru; issues. 
U. S. - (1975). 
II 
It is worth noting at the outset some of the questions 
that these cases do not present. They do not present 
any question of the right of a pri,vate social organization 
to limit its membership on racial or any other grounds.5 
They do not present any question of the right of a pri-
vate school to limit its student body to ·boys, to girls, 
or to adherents of a particular religious faith , since 42 
U. S. C. § 1981 is in no way addressed to such categories 
of selectivity. They do not even present the application 
of § 1981 to private sectarian schools that practice racial 
5 See generally Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 
U, S, '131, 439-440. 
Q 
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exclusion on religious grounds.6 Rather, these cases 
present only two basic questions: 7 whether § 1981 pro-
hibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian 
schools from denying admission to prospective students 
because they a.re Negroes, and, if so, whether that federal 
law is constitutional as so applied. 
A. Applicability of § 1981 
It is now well established that § 1 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (1970), pro-
hibits racial discrimination in the making and enforce-
ments of private contracts.8 See Johnson v. Railway 
6 Nothing in this record suggests that either the Fairfax-Brewster 
School or Bobbe's Private School excludes applicants on religious 
grounds, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is 
thus in no way here involevd. 
7 Apart, of course, from the sta.tute of limitations and attorney's 
fees issues involved in No. 75-306, and dealt with in Part III of 
this opinion. 
8 The historical note appended to the portion of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, presently codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1981, indicates that 
§ 1981 is derived solely from § 16 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 
16 Stat. 144. The omission from the historical note of any reference 
to § 18 of the 1870 Act, which re-enacted § 1 of the 1866 Act, or 
to the 1866 Act itself reflects a similar imission from the historical 
note that was prepared in connection with the 1874 codification of 
federal statutory law. The earlier note was appended to the draft 
version of the 1874 revision prepared by three commissioners 
appointed by Congress. 
On the basis of this omission, at least one court has concluded, 
in an opinion that antedated Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 421 U. S. 454, that § 1981 is based exclusively on the Four-
teenth Amendment and does not, therefore, reach private action. 
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (MD Ala. 1971), aff'd 
on other grounds, 458 F. 2d 1119 ( CA5). But the holding in that 
case ascribes an inappropriate significance to the historical note 
presently accompanying § 1981, and thus implicitly to the earlier 
reviser's note. 
The commissioners who prepared the 1874 draft revision were 
appointed pursuant to the Act of June 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 74, 
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Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460; Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U. S. 431, 439-
440. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 
441-443, n. 78. 
re-enacted in Act of May 4, 1870, 16 Stat. 96. They were given 
authority to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes 
of the United Sta.tes," Act of June 27, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 74, by 
"bring[ing] together all statutes and parts of statutes which, from 
similarity of subject, ought to be brought together, omitting redun-
aant or obsolete enactments . . . . " Id., § 2, 14 Stat. 75 (emphasis 
added). The commissioners also had the authority under § 3 of 
the Act of June 27, 1866, to "designate such statutes or parts of 
statutes as, in their judgment, ought to be repealed, with their 
reasons for such repeal." 14 Stat. 75. 
It is clear that the commissioners did not intend to recommend· 
to Congress, pursuant to their authority under § 3 of the Act of 
June 27, 1866, that any portion of § l of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 be repealed upon the enactment of the 1874 revision. When 
the commissioners were exercising their § 3 power of recommenda-
tion, they so indicated, in accordance with the requirements of § 3'. 
See 1 Draft Revision of the United Sta,tes Statutes, Title XXVI, 
§§· 8, 13. No indication of a recommended change was noted with 
respect to the section of the draft which was to become § 1981. It 
is thus most plausible to assume that the revisers omitted a refer--· 
ence to § 1 of the 1866 Act or § 18 of the 1870 Act either inad-. 
vertently or on the assumption that the relevant language in § 1 of' 
the 1866 Act was superfluous in light of the closely parallel language 
m § 16 of the 1870 Act. 
We have, in past decisions, expressed the view that § 16 of the 
1870 Act was merely a re-enactment, with minor changes, of certain' 
fanguage in § 1 of the 1866 Act. E. g., Georgia v. Rachel, 384 
U. S. 780, 790-791. If this is so, then an assumption on the part 
of the revisers that the language of the 1866 Act was superfluous 
was perfectly accura.te. But even assuming that the purpose behind· 
the enactment of § 16 of the 1870 Act was narrower than that 
behind the enactment of relevant language in § 1 of the 1866 Act-
and thus that the revisers ' hypothetical assumption was wrong-there 
is still no basis for inferring that Congress clid not understand the-
draft legislation which eventually became 42 U. S. C. § 1981 to be-
drawn from both § 16 of the 1870 Act and § 1 of the 1866 Act. 
To fuld otherwise would. he to attribute to Congress an intent:' 
8 
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In Jones the Court held that the portion of § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 presently codified as 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1982 prohibits private racial discrimination in the sale 
or r;;_tal of real or personal property. Relying on the 
legislative history of § 1, from which both § 1981 and 
§ 1982 derive, the Court ocncluded that Congress in-
tended to prohibit "all racial discrimination, private arid 
public, in the sale ... of property," 392 U. S., at 437, 
and that this prohibition was within Congress' power 
under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment "rationally to 
determine what are the badges and the incidents of 
slavery, and ... to translate that determination into 
effective legislation." Id., at 440-441. 
As the Court indicates in Jones, 392 U. S., at 441-443, 
n. 78, that holding necessarily implied that the portion 
of § 1 of the 1866 Act presently codified as 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981 likewise reaches purely private acts of racial dis-
crimination. The statutory holding in Jones was that 
the "[1866] Act was designed to do just""1.at its terms 
, suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or 
not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumer-
ated therein-including the right to purchase or lease 
proper,ty." 392 U. S., at 436. One of the "rights enu-
merated" in § 1 is "the same right ... to make and 
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... /' 
14 Stat. 27. Just as in Jones a Negro's § 1 right to pur-
chase property on equal terms with whites was violated 
when a private person refused to sell to the prospective 
to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on the ' basis of 
an unexplained omission from the revisers' marginal notes, Such 
an inference would be inconsistent with Congress' delineation in § 3 
of the Act of June 27, 1866, of specific procedures to be followed 
in connection with the submission of substantive proposals by the 
revisers. It would. also conflict with the square holding of this 
Court in Johnson v. Railway Express , Agency, Inc ., supra, that, 
§ 1981 reaches private conduct. 
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purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a 
Negro's § 1 right to "make and enforce contracts" is 
violated if a private off eror refuses to extend to a Negro, 
solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to 
enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.9 
The applicability of the holding in Jones to § 1981 
was confirmed by this Court's decisions in Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., supra, and Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, supra. In Tillman the peti-
tioners urged that a private swimming club had violated 
42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 2000a et seq. by enforcing 
a guest policy that discriminated against Negroes. The 
Court noted that " [ t] he operative language of both 
§ 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866, 
c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27." 410 U. S., at 439. Referring to 
its earlier rejection of the respondents' contention that 
Wheaton-Haven was exempt from § 1982 under the pri-
vate club exception of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Court concluded that "[i]n light of the historical inter-
telationship between § 1981 and § 1982 [there is] no 
reason to construe these sections differently when ap-
9 The petitioning schools and school association rely on a state-
ment in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 469, that "private 
bias [in the admission of students to private schools] is not barred 
by the Constjtution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but 
neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid from the 
State." Id., at 469 (emphasis added). They argue that this state-
ment supports their contention that § 1981 does not proscrjbe 
private racial discrimination that interferes with the formation of 
contracts for educational services. But Norwood involved no issue 
concerning the applicability of § 1981 to such discrimination. The 
question there was rather whether a state statute providing free 
text books to students attending private segregated schools violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, 
Norwood expressly noted that "some private discrimina.tion is sub-
ject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 
of the T11irteenth Amendment .. . • " 413 U. S., at 470. 
10 
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plied, on these facts, to the claim of Wheaton-Haven 
that it is a private club." Id., a.t 440. Accordingly the 
Court remanded the care to the District Court for 
further proceedings "free of the misconception that 
Wheaton-Haven is exempt from §§ 1981, 1982, and 
2000a." Ibid. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
supra, the Court noted that § 1981 "relates primarily to 
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of 
contracts," 421 U. S. , at 459, and held unequivocally 
"that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimina-
tion in private employment on the basis of ~ace." Id., 
at 459- 460. 
It is a;pparent that the racial exclusion practiced by ( 
the Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe's Private School 
amounts to a classic violation of § 1981. The parents 
of Colin Gonzales and Michael McCrary sought to enter 
into contractual relationships with Bobbe's Private 
School for educational services. Colin Gonzales' parents 
sought to enter into a simila.r relationship with the Fair-
fax-Brewster School. Under those contractual relation-
ships, the schools would have received payments for serv-
ices rendered, and the prospective students would have 
received instruction in return for those payments. The 
educational services of Bobbe's Private School and the 
Fairfax-Brewster School were advertised and. offered to 
me~ r~ the general public. e --
10 This case does not raise the issue of whether the "private club 
or other (°private J establishment" exemption in § 201 ( e) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (e) , operates to nar-
row § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. As the Court of Appeals 
implied, that exemption, if applicable at all, comes into play only 
if t he establishment is "not in fact open to the public. . . ." 42 
U.S. C. § 2000a(e). See 515 F . 2d, at 1088-1089. Both Bobbe's· 
Private School and the Fairfax-Brewster School advert ised in the 
"Yellow Pages" of the telephone directory and both used mass mail-
ing in attempting to att ract students . As the Court of Ap)?eals; 
11 
offered services on an equal basis to white and nonwhite 
students. As the Court of Appeals held, "there is ample 
evidence in the record to support the trial judge's fac-
tual determinations ... [that] Colin [Gonzales] and 
Michael [McCrary] were denied admission to the schools 
because of their race." The Court of Appeals' conclu-
sion that § 1981 was thereby violated follows inexorably 
from the language of that statute, as construed in Jones, 
Tillman, and Johnson. 
The petitioning schools and school association argue l 
principally that § 1981 does not reach private acts of 
racial discrimination. That view is wholly inconsistent 
with Jones' interpretation of the legislative history of § 1 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an interpretation that 
observed, these "schools are private only in the sense that they are 
managed by private persons and they are not direct recipients of 
public funds. Their actual and potential constituency, however, is 
more public than private. They appeal to the parents of all children 
in the area who can meet their academic and other admission re-
quirements. This is clearly demonstrated in this case by the public 
advertisements." 515 F. 2d, at 1089. 
The pattern of exclusion is thus directly analogous to that at 
issue in Sullivan v. Little Hunti,ng Park . Inc., 396 U. S. 229, and 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven R ecreation Assn., 410 U. S. 431, where 
the so-called private clubs were open to all objectively qualified 
whites-i. e., those living within a specified geographic area. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that a plausible "implied repeal" argu-
ment could be made in this context in any event. Implied repeals 
occur if two acts are irreconcilable conflict. Radzanower v. 
T ouche R oss & Co., - U.S.-, - . Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, of which the "private club" exemption is a part, does 
not by its terms reach private schools. Since there would appear to 
be no potential for overlapping application of § 1981 and Title II 
of the 1964 Act with respect to racial discrimination practiced by 
private schools, there would also appear to be no potential for con-
flict between the § 1981 and Title II 's "private club" exemption in 
this context. See Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is 
Section 1981 the Answer? , 48 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1147, 1159 (1973}. 
12 
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was reaffirmed in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc,, 
396 U. S. 229, and again in Tillman v. Wheaton-Have;,, 
Recreation Assn., supra. And this consistent interpre-
tation of the law necessarily requires the conclusion that 
§ 1981, like § 1982, reaches private conduct. See Till-
man v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., ·410 U. S., at 
439-440; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
U. S., at 459-460. 
It is noteworthy that Congress in enacting the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, as 
amended, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. Supp. IV), 
· specifically considered and rejected an amendment that 
.. would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as 
interpreted by this Court in Jones, insofar as it affords 
private sector employees a-right of action-based on racial 
discrimination in emg_lo~ent. See Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 4 U. S., at 459.11 There could 
11 Senator Hru:;ka proposed an amendment which would have 
made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay 
Act the exclusive source of federal relief for employment discrimina-
tion. 118 Cong. Rec. 3371 (1972). Senator Williams, the floor 
manager of the penning bill and one of its original sponsors, argued 
against the proposed amendment on the ground that " [ i] t is not 
our purpose to repeal existing civil rights laws" and that to do so 
"would severely weaken our overall effort to combat the presence 
of employment discrimination." Ibid. Senator Williams specifically 
noted that " [ t] he law against employment discrimination did not 
begin with Title VII and the EEOC, nor is it intended to end with 
· it. The right of individuals to bring suits in Federal courts to 
redress individual acts of discrimination, including employment dis-
crimination was first provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
1871, 52 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983. It was recently stated by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Mayer, that these acts pro-
vide fundamental constitutional guarantees. In any case, the courts 
have specifically held that Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts of 
1866 and 1871 are not mutually exclusive, and must be read to-
gether to provide alternative means to redress individual grievances. 
Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska will 
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hardly be a clearer indication of congressional agreement 
with the view that § 1981 does reach private acts of 
racial discrimination. Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258, 
269-285; Joint Industry Board v. United States, 391 U.S. 
224, 228-229. In these circumstances there is no basis 
for deviating from the well-settled principles of stare 
decisis applicable to this Court's construction of federal 
statutes. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 
n. 14.i2 
B. Constitutionality of § 1981 as Applied 
The question remains whether § 1981, as applied, vio-
lates constitutionally protected rights of free associa-
tion and privacy, or a parent's right to direct the educa-
tion of his children.13 
1. Freedom of Association 
In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, and similar 
decisions, the Court has recognized a First Amendment 
right "to engage in association for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas .... " Id., at 460. That right is pro-
tected because it promotes and may well be essential to 
repeal the first major piece of civil rights legislation in this Nation's 
history. We cannot do that." Ibid. The Senate was persuaded 
by Senator Williams' entreaty that it not "strip from [the] indi-
vidual his rights that have been established, going back to the first 
Civil Rights Law of 1866," id., at 3372, and Senator Hruska's pro-
posed amendment was rejected. Id ., at 3372--3373. 
12 The Court in Edelman stated as follows: 
"In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: 'Stare decisis is usually 
the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right .. .. 
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious 
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation . .. .'" 415 
U. S. 651,671 n. 14 (citation omitted) . 
13 It is clear that the schools have standing to assert these argu-
ments on behalf of their patrons. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U. S. 510, 535-536. 
14 
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the "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view, particularly controversial ones" that the 
First Amendment is designed to foster. Id., at 460. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, - U.S.-,-; NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415. 
From this principle it may be assumed that parents 
have a First Amendment right to send their children to 
educational institutions that promote the belief that 
racial segregation is desirable, and that the children have 
an equal right to attend such institutions.. But it does 
not follow that the practice of excluding racial minori-
ties from such institutions is also protected by the same 
principle. As the Court stated in Norwood v. Harrison, 
413 U. S. 455, "the Constitution .. . places no value on 
discrimination," id., at 469, and while "[i]nvidious pri-
vate discrimination may be characterized as a form of 
exercising freedom of association protected by the First 
Amendment ... it has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections, And even some private dis-
crimination is subject to special remedial legislation in 
certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment; Congress has made such discrimination 
unlawful in other significant contexts." 413 U. S., at 
470. In any event, as the Court of Appeals noted, "there 
is no showing that discontinuance of [the] discriminatory 
admission practices would inhibit in any way the teach-
ing in these schools of any ideas or dogma." 515 F. 2d, 
at 1087. 
2. Parental Rights 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, the Court held 
that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right "to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children," id., at 399, and, concomitantly, the right to 
send ones children to a ·private school that offers special-
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ized training-in that case, instruction in the German 
language. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 
the Court applied "the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 
id., at 534, to hold unconstitutional an Oregon law re-
quiring the parent, guardian, or other person having 
custody of a child between eight and 16 years of age 
to send that child to public school on pain of crimi-
nal liability. The Cour,t thought it "entirely plain that 
the [statute] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of children under their control." Id., at 534-535. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the Court stressed 
the limited scope of Pierce, pointing out that it lent "no 
support to the contention that parents may replace state 
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic 
views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive 
and happy member of society" but rather "held simply 
that while a State may posit [educational] standards, it 
may not preempt the educational process by requiring 
children to attend public schools." Id., at 239. And in 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, the Court once 
again stressed the "limited scope of Pierce," id., at 461, 
which simply "affirmed the right of private schools to 
exist and to operate .... " Id., at 462. 
It is clear that the present application of § 1981 in-
fringes no parental right recognized in Meyer, Pierce, 
Yoder, or Norwood. No challenge is made to the peti- / 
tioners' right to operate their private schools or the right 
of parents to send their children to a particular private 
school rather than a public school. Nor do these cases 
involve a challenge to the subject matter which is taught 
at any private school. Thus, the Fairfax-Brewster 
School and Bobbe's Private School and members of the 
intervenor association remain presumptively free to in-:-
culcate whatever values and standards they deem 
!6 
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desirable. Meyer and its progeny entitle them to -no 
more. 
3. The Right of Privacy 
The Court has held that in some situations the Consti-
tution confers a right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 152-153; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 
453; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-565; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484-485. See also Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U. S. 535, 541. 
While the application of § 1981 to the conduct at issue 
here-a private school's adherence to a racially dis-
criminatory admissions policy-does not represent gov-
ernmental intrusion into the privacy of the home or a 
similarly intimate setting,14 it does implicate parental 
interests. These interests are related to the procreative 
rights protected in Roe v. Wade, supra, and Griswold v. 
Connecticut, supra. A person's decision whether to bear 
a child and a parent's decision concerning the manner 
in which his child is to be educated may fairly be char-
acterized as exercises of familial rights and responsi-
bilities. But it does not follow that because government 
is largely or even entirely precluded from regulating the 
child-bearing decision, it is similarly restricted by the 
Constitution from regulating the implementation of pa-
rental decisions concerning a child's education. 
The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents 
have a constitutional right to send their children to pri-
vate schools and a constitutional right to select private 
schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no 
constitutional right to provide their children with private 
school education unfettered by reasonable government 
regulation. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213; 
14 Seen. 10, supra. 
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. , at 534; Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U. S., at 402.15 Indeed, the Court in 
Pierce expressly acknowledged "the power of the State 
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise 
and examine them, their teachers and pupils .. .. " 268 
U.S., at 534. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166. 
Section 1981, as applied to the conduct at issue here, 
constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power under 
§ 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment fuily consistent with 
Meyer, Pierce, and the cases that followed in their wake. 
As the Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, 
"[i]t has never been doubted ... 'that the power vested 
in Congress to enforce [the Thirteenth Amendment] by 
appropriate legislation' ... includes the power to enact 
laws 'direct and primary, operating upon the acts of in-
dividuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or 
not.' " 392 U. S., at 438 (citation omitted). The pro-
hibition of racial discrimination that interferes with the 
making and enforcement of contracts for private edu-
cational services furthers goals closely analogous to those 
served by § 198l's elimination of racial discrimination in 
the making of private employment contracts 16 and~ 
more generally, to § 1982's guarantee that "a dollar in 
the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as 
15 The M eyer-Pierce-Yoder "parental" right and the privacy right, 
while dealt with separately in this opinion, may be no more than 
verbal variations of a single constitut ional right. See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113, 152-153 (Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, supra, cited for the proposition that t his Court 
has recognized a constitut ional right of privacy) . 
16 The Court has recognized in similar contexts the link between 
equality of opportunity to obtain an education and equality of em-
ployment opportunity. See M cLaurin v. Oklahoma State R egents, 
339 U. S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629: 
18 
75-62, etc.-OPINION 
RUNYON v. McCRARY 
a dollar in the hands of a white man." J on?s .v. Alfred 
· H . Mayer Co., 392 U.S., at 443. 
III 
A. Statute of Limitations 
The District Court held that the damage suit of the 
petitioners in No. 75-306, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales, which 
was initiated three and one-half years after their cause 
of action accrued, was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
The petitioners contend that both courts erred in "bor-
rowing" the wrong Virginia statute of limitations. 
Had Congress placed a limit upon the time for bring-
ing an action under § 1981, that would, of course, end 
the matter. But Congress was silent. And "[a]s to 
actions at law," which a damage suit under § 1981 clearly 
is, "the silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean 
that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limita-
tion." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395. See 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462; 
Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96; O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 
U. S. 318; Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. At-
lanta, 203 U. S. 390. As the Court stated in Holmberg, 
supra, at 395, " [ t] he implied absorption of State statutes 
of limitations within the interstices of the federal enact-
ments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where 
Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial de-
termination within the general framework of familiar 
legal principles.'' 
Virginia has not enacted a statute that specifically 
governs civil rights suits. In the absence of such a spe-
cific statute, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the first sentence of 2 Va. Code Ann. § 8-24 
provides the relevant limitations period for a § 1981 ac-
tion: " [ e] very action for personal injuries shall be: 
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brought within two years next after the right to bring 
the same shall have accrued." The petitioners assert 
that this provision applies only to suits predicated upon 
actual physical injury, and that the correct limitation 
period is five years, by virtue of the second sentence of 
§ 8-24, which comprehends all other "personal" actions: 
"Every personal action, for which no limitation is 
otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within five 
years next after the r,ight to bring the same shall 
have accrued, if it be for a matter of such na,ture 
that in case a party die it can be brought by or 
against his representative; and, if it be for a matter 
not of such nature, shall be brought within one year 
next after the right to bring the same shall have 
accrued." 
The petitioners' contention is certainly a rational one, 
but we are not persuaded that the Court of Appea.ls was 
mistaken in applying the two-year state statute. The 
issue was not a new one for that Court, for it had given 
careful consideration to the question of the appropriate 
Virginia statute of limitations to be applied in federal 
civil rights litiga,tion on at least two previous occasions. 
Allen v. Gifford, 462 F. 2d 615; Almond . v. Kent, 459 F .. 
2d 200. We are not disposed to displace the considered 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on an issue whose 
resolution is so heavily contingent upon an ana.lysis of 
state law, particularly when the established rule has 
been relied upon and applied in numerous suits filed in 
the federal district courts in Virginia.11 In other situa-
17 See, e. g., Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 391 (ED 
Va.); Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F . Supp. 463 (WD Va.); Wilkinson 
v. Hamel, 381 F. Supp. 768, 769 (WD Va.); Cradle v. Superintend-
ent, Correctional Field Unit #7. 374 F. Supp. 435, 437 n. 3 (WD 
Va.) ; Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Education, 372 F. Supp. 
20 
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tions in which a federal right has depended upon the 
interpretation of state law, "the Court has accepted the 
interpretation of state law in which the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals have concurred even if an 
examination of the state law issue without such guidance 
might have justified a different conclusion." Bishop v. 
Wood, No. 75-1303, decided June - , 1976, slip op., 
at 5, citing inter alia, United States v. Durham Lumber 
Co., 363 U. S. 522; Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472; 
Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620. 
Moreover, the petitioners have not cited any Virginia 
court decision to the effect that the !,erm "personal 
injuries" in § 8-24 means only "physical injuries." It 
could be argued with at least equal force that the phrase 
"personal injuries" was designed to distinguish those 
causes of action involving torts against the person from 
those involving damage to property. And whether the 
damage claim of the Gonzales' be properly characterized 
as involving "injured feelings and humiliation," as the 
Court of Appeals held, 515 F. 2d, at 1097, or the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights, as the petitioners contend, 
there is no dispute that the damage was to their persons, 
not to their realty or personalty. Cf. Carva Food Corp. 
v. Dawley, 202 Va. 543, 118 S. E.· 2d 664 (1961); 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Turner, 211 Va. 552, 178 S. E. 
2d 503 (1971). 
We hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not 
err _in affirming the District Court's ruling that the 
Gonzales' suit for damages was barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
B. Attorney's Fees 
The District Court, without explanation or citation of 
authority, awarded attorney's fees of $1,000 against each 
1378, 1383 (ED Va.) ; Landman v. Brown, 350 F. Supp. 303, 306 
(ED Va.); Sitwell v. Burnette, 349 F. Supp. 83, 85- 86 (WD Va), 
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of the two schools. The Court of Appeals reversed this. 
part of the District Court's judgment. Anticipating our 
decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness 
Society, 421 U. S. 240, the appellate court refused to 
adopt the so-called private attor.ney general theory under 
which attorneys' fees could be awarded to any litigant 
who vindicates an important public interest, and it could 
find no other ground for the award: no statute explicitly 
provides for attorney's fees in § 1981 cases,1 8 and neither 
school had evinced "obstinate obduracy" or bad faith in 
contesting the action. 515 F. 2d, at 1089-1090. 
Mindful of this Court's Alyeska decision, the petition-
ers do not claim that their vindication of the right of 
Negro children to attend private schools alone entitles 
them to a.ttorney's fees. They make instead two other 
arguments. 
First, the petitioners claim that the schools exhibited 
bad faith , not by litigating the legal merits of their 
racially discriminatory admissions policy, but by deny-
ing that they in fact had discrimina.ted. To support 
this claim, the petitioners cite a number of conflicts in 
testimony between the McCrary's, the Gonzales', and 
other witnesses, on the one hand, and the officia.ls of the 
schools, on the other, which the District Court resolved 
against the schools in finding racial discrimination. 
Indeed, the trial court characterized as "unbelievable" 
the testimony of three officials of the Fairfax-Brewster· 
School. 363 F. Supp., at 1202. By stubbornly contest~ 
ing the facts , the petitioners assert, the schools attempted 
to deceive the court and, in any event, needlessly pro-
longed the litigation. 
We cannot accept this argument. To be sure, the 
18 Compare, e. g., Title II of t he Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 ' 
U. S. C. § 2000a- 3 (b) . See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co . v. Wilder.- . 
ness 8_ociety, 421 U. S. 240, 260-262 and. n . 33... 
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Court has recognized the "inherent power" of the federal 
courts to assess attorn_ey's fees when the losing party 
has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons .... " F. D. Rich Co. v. United 
States, 417 .U .. S. 116, 129. See Alyeska, supra, at 258-
259; Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. f527. But in this 
case the factual predicate to a finding of bad faith is ab-
sent. Simply because the facts were found against the 
schools does not by itself prove that threshold of irre-
sponsible conduct for which l'l, penalty assessment would 
be justified. Whenever the facts in a case are disputed, 
a court perforce must decide that one party's version 
is inaccurate. Yet it would be untenable to conclude 
ipso facto that that party had acted in bad faith. As 
the Court of Appeals stated, 515 F. 2d, at 1089-1090, 
"[f] aults in perception or memory often account for dif-
fering trial testimony, but that has not yet been thought 
a sufficient ground to shift the expense of litigation." 
We find no warrant for disturbing the holding of the 
Court of Appeals that _no bad faith permeated the de-
fense by the schools of this lawsuit. 
The petitioners' second argument is that while 42 
U. S. C. § 1981 contains no authorization for the award 
of attorney's fees, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 implicitly does. In 
relevant part, that section reads : 
"The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on 
the district courts by the provisions of this chap-
ter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in 
the United States in their civil rights, and for their 
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in con-
formity with the laws of the United States, so far 
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into 
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted 
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions nec-
-essary to furnish suitable remedies and punish. 
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offenses against law, the common law, as modified 
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the 
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such 
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is 
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, shall be extended to and govern 
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the 
cause .... " 
The petitioners assert, in the words of their brief, that 
§ 1988 "embodies a uniquely broad commission to the 
federal courts to search among federal and state statutes 
and common law for the remedial devices and proce-
dures which best enforce the substantive provisions of 
Sec. 1981 and other civil rights statutes." As part of 
that "broad commission" the federal courts are obligated, 
the petitioners say, to award attorney's fees whenever 
such fees are needed to encourage private parties to 
seek relief against illegal discrimination. 
This contention is without merit. It is true that in 
order to vindicate the rights conferred by the various 
civil rights acts, § 1988 "authorize[s] federal courts, 
where federal law is unsuited or insufficient 'to furnish 
suitable remedies,' to look to principles of the common 
law, as altered by state law .... " M oar v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 702-703. See Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 239-240. But the 
Court has never interpreted § 1988 to warrant the award 
of attorney's fees. And nothing in the legislative history 
of that statute suggests that such a radical departure 
from the long established American rule forbidding the 
award of attorney's fees was intended. 
More fundamentally, the petitioners' theory would re-
quire us to overlook the penultimate clause of § 1988: 
"so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
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counted in some detail in Alyeska, supra, at 247 passi.m, 
the law of the United States, but for a few well recog-
nized exceptions not present in this case,19 has always 
been that absent explicit congressional authorization, 
attorney's fees are not a recoverable cost of litigation. 
Hence, in order to "furnish" an award of attorney's fees, 
we would have to find that at least as to cases brought 
under statutes to which § 1988 applies, Congress intended 
to set aside this longstanding American rule of law. We 
are unable to conclude, however, from the generalized 
commands of § 1988, that Congress intended any such 
result. 
We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in setting aside the District Court's award of attor-
ney's fees. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is in all respects affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
19 See, e. g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (allowance of 
attorney's fees out of a common fund); Toledo Scale Co. v. Comput-
ing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399 (assessment of fees as part of the fine 
for willful disobedience of a court order); F. D. Rich Co. v. United 
States, 417 U. S. 116 (assessment of attorney's fees against part;y 
~cting in bad faith). 
-
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remanding the counsel fee issue. The award was made be-
fore Alyeska was decidea and it's obvious that the trial 
judge never focused on the necessity for finding whether 
or not there was bad faith. As a result there are no 
findings in the record and we are remitted to making the 
findings properly to be made by the trial judge. 
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To: Justice Powell ~xem% Date: June 12, 1976 
From: Chris 
Here is a draft of a Runyon concurrence. I tightened 
it a little bit and made one significant change: I downplayed 
the reliance on "traditional" contractual relationships. 
three 
This was done for xJOB/reasons: First, I am not sure that 
EBmmHXXERXXR commercial contracts based on public offerings 
are any less "traditional" or "normal" than those in which 
the offerees are selected on a particularized basis. In 
fact, I would have thought it was the other way around. 
-
Second, Justice White does not purport to say that there 
is a basic personal right efxEeRxxixHxiBRRXxEimHRxieHx 
eJ e.v,deu.t. 
in the continuation Aof traditional contract law. That 
right would have to be of constitutional dimensions to 
invalidate a statute, and I doubt that xxaEixie the common 
law of contracts rises to that level. Rather, the right, 
if any, is of privacy and association. That is ~ the 
"pre-selection" aspect that you stress comes into play. 
' 
fix Third, w I think we should also exclude from the 
reach of§ 1981 those contracts in which the class of 
offerees is not pre-selected but in which there ix are 
grounds to assume that the offeror will select among those 
-a, pubJk. 
who respond to .-..e~ offer on the gEH grounds of personal 
compatibility. As I suggest, private tutors, babysitters, 
and housekeepers fall into that category. Private nurses 
are another example. 
I have written the draft without reference to the § 1983 
em~,e.vn . particularly 
11. I really don't think that this case is XR~mEXH 
inconsistent with your position on that issue. In every 
case, the Court is faced with the decision of how much 
weight to give to precedent, and, as Justice Rhenquiskt 
said in his lunch with us, that decision must turn on 
xkHXHRiijHH factors unique to each case. In a sense,~ 
accepting precedent as binding here is inconsistent with 
( - -
every other case in which precedent is not followed or 
in which earlier decisions are distinguished on purely 
technical grounds. There is nox reason to think that 
2. 
by your refusal to be 
xpHEXR special problems are created ~HERHXHX~EHXEEXREX 
XHHi bound by precedent in the Monroe v. Pape situxation 
merely because both these statutes were enacted at the 
se~ond . 
same point in history. My s • concern is that other 
~OtU" d iscuu iOT\ of 
members of the Court may be offended by epse:i:.Hg the 
A 
exhaustion issue. Your view did not prevail in Burrell but 
J:he position of ) 
that case was DIG'd, so/ t he majority of the ~Ex Court 
BiaxRExxkaXH is not known to the public. I fear other 
Justices who disagree with you on this point may feel 
it HR inappropriate to DIG a case (in part on the basis 
chW\qt.d "t-rovY\ -lM. time. o-\ wl\ic\\ c.erl wcts ~:_:;: d 
of your vote, which you -••••--•••••••-•- be <of 
~ eluctance to have a reaffirmance of the non-exhaustion 
doctrine made in a majority opinion) and then have a 
single Justice express an opinion on the issue in an 
unrelated case. :t:t · IL.I Llmm111R11• 11 ••• Thl!'re may be some 
fear that the public will read your comment as the . 
expression qf the prevalent view of the Court. At the least, it 
does not give those who disagree with you a chance to respond. 
If you disagree with me, however, a footnote on the 
§ 1983 point can be added at the place I have indicated 
on pagH the first page of the opinion. It would read as 
follows: 
- ' ~ ~~~ 
"In r in ances the Court has drifted almost accidentally 
into rather l!?@ffl@~Mhi.e interpretations of the post-Civil 
Wc!_r_Acts. he most sttiking example is the pE proposition, 
riowaEEHp~accepted uncritically, that§ 1983 does not 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies under any 
circumstances. This far-reaching conclusion was arrived 
at largely on the g basis of per curiae cases 
decided without the benefit of briefing and argument. 
See)~, 8XMX~EX~¥xgaxxxmxmi:a~x~i8x~89xM¥&¥x&xu 
#9nx~lwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); 
Hou9hton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. 
California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). I consider the 
posture of §§i98i 1981 and 1982 in the jurisprudence 
of this Court to be quite different from that of§ 1981." 
Chris 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring . 
If the slate were clean I may well be inclined to 
agree with Mr. Justice White that§ 1981 was not intended 
to iimxx restrict private contractual choices. Much of 
the review of the history and purpose of this statute set 
forth in his dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It 
seems to me, however, that it comes too late. 
The applicability of§ 1981 to private contracts has 
been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel 
~ 
free to disregard these precedents. As they are reviewed 
in the Court's opinion, I mxRi merely cite them: Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 (1975), 
an opinion in which I joined; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recr eation Ass 1n., 410 U.S. 431, 439-440 (1973), another 
opinion in which I joined·; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
396 U.S. 229, 325-237 (1969); and . particularly and primarily, 
Jones· v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968). 
Although the latter two cases involved§ 1982, rather than 
§ 1981, I agree that their oe12faWt-y considered holdings 
with respect to the purpose and meaning of§ 1982 necessarily 
applies to both statutes in view of their common derivation. 
Although ERRXRRRBXR~xxaEER~xxxkx the range of consequences 
- -
-2-
suggested by the dissenting opinion, ~XE post, at __ -__ , 
go far beyond what we hold today, I am concerned that our 
decision not be construed more broadly than would be justified. 
By its terms§ 1981 RXH necessarily imposes some restrictions 
on those who would refuse to extend to Negroes "the same rights 
to make and enforce contracts ... as [are] enjoyed by white 
citizens." But our holding that this restriction• extends 
c~~ 
to actions by private individuals does not imply ' the 
A 
intrusive investigation into the El motives of HB every 
~xilC11XH refusal to contract by a private citizen that is 
suggested by the dissent. As the court of appeals xxia 
personal 
suggested, xkKXHXXXH some contracts xmtt are so7 ~rx.Jra.i H"as 
to have a discernible rule of HXXKE exclusivity x which is 
inoffensive to § 1981." _ _ F.2d,x at 
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra, xxxi~E~ 
we were faced with an association in which "[t]here was no 
plan or purpose of exclusiveness."xxx flm Participation was 
"open to every white person within the geographic area, there 
being no selective element other than race." 396 U.S., at 
236. See also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., 
XRXXRHXEmtXIKXXXElfx«mtxxa«maixxKiaxxmtx~ 
ra, at 438. :iRXXkHXEEIRXXBEXJAXix:w)te:x:e:xxke:xl!lffKXl!IXXXKill~:t. 
i:n ~ personal contractual relationsnips, 
such as those where 
XKEIXKx:imi:xx · W~axa/ tlie offeror selects those imi with whomf 
he Fco bargain on an individualized .atid "ao:et,, .. larize<I-
:::&:.. -~ .... _:ft.?-'=c, 0 5.&l.,~ 
•~,(..He.., ~:i_~=f ~ 
~ 4 41afl ?,tJI• ~-~~II.,~ .... ~ ... ~-~c...1c,.__ I 
basis, •--- or where the contract is the foundation of 
~ ~ hixiC t==iaM-4 association 
a~~ e:r td ea larr J.ij i:Rr11 I It t ± t e l!IHX:Sl!IRXixxH:i:xxi:aHKR~ (such as 
~ JJ,rt4 tt:1--~#d-- ' 
L that between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or 
A. 
housekeeper), there is reason to assume that, althoug~ the 
choice made by the offeror is selective, it reflects 
112. "a purpose of & ½u exclusiveness" -t:i I lllDi 
other than the desire to bar members of the Ji§ II g IIL@dL 
Negro race. 
The case presented on tterecord before us does not 
involve this type of ¥f!!Pf personal contractual relationship. 
As the court of appeals are private only 
in the sense that they are RaxxB:ix managed by private 
persons and they are not direct recipients of public funds. 
' 
Their actual and potential constitutency, however, is more 
public than private." i'kHµx F.2d, at The schools 
HXR extended a public offer open, on its face, to any child 
meeting cer tji ~~ RX~ minimum x qualifications who chose to 
accept . xkH They advertised in the "yellow" pages of the 
XHl!I telephone directories and engaged i:R extensively in 
general mail solicitations to attract students. ThexH 
schools are x operated strictly on a commercial basis, an d 
one El!IKiE fairly could construe their open-enaed :ix invitations 
as offers that matured into binding contracts when accep t ed 
- -
-4-
by those who met the academic, financial, and other racially 
neutral specified conditions as to qualifications for 
schools 
entrance. There is no reason to assume that the EXXBXEX had 
XRREH reason for exercising an option of 
~ l~!rJ personal choice among those who respon'X .__ to public 
offers. W2ximuia A small kindergarten or music class 
operated i"l"P"a•• ..,,.a. • ~~idesee on the basis of personal 
~.~~ N t&4'k,t O ,f-~ 
invitations extended to a 'illiwi pre-identified students, 
for example, -, would present a far different case.~ 
I do not suggest that a "bright line" can be drawn 
that easily separates the type of ~rioaee contract offer 
xkax within the reach of§ 1981 from the type without. 
the 
The case before us is clearly on one side of xkB line, 
however defined, and the kindergarten and 'music school 
examples are clearly on the other side. Close questions 
undoubtedly will arise in the grey area that necessarily 
exists in between. But some of the applicable principles 
and considerations, for the most part identified by the 
Court's opinion, are clear: Section 1981, as interpreted 
by our prior decisions, does reach certain acts of racial 
discrimination 11 that are "private" in the sense that they 
involve no state action.' But recd 22tr 5 i:i:ael,iding tbe waking_ 
-oi a cancract, that i-s t3:l!'i.-YEH:e u:i. tb.e sense tbat it is 
- -5- -j 
But choices, including those involved in MXkxHg entering 
into a contract, that are~'private] in the sense that 
•~•4-L ~ ~.~~~ . - ~-du~·~,...,, =:._~ ,) / 
1.onship\~ they are not part of a 
A.,....,,_~ 
x2gx£ reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual 
ente~ng into a personal a• J :t$! ~= relationship,~ 
certainly were never intended to be restricted by the 
Nineteenth Century Civil Rights Acts. The open offer 
to the public generally involved in the case before us 
is simply not a "private" contract in this sense. 
I/cu~~ .J, ~ (.I.J. ~ o/ ~ 
~- . 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I 
If the slate were clean I may well be inclined to agree 
with Mr. Justice White that§ 1981 was not intended to 
restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review 
of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his 
dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me, 
however, that it comes too late. 
The applicability of§ 1981 to private contracts has 
been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel 
free to disregard these precedents.* As they are reviewed 
*In some instances the Court has driftedalmost accidentally 
into rather extreme interpretations of the post-Civil War Acts. 
The most striking example is the proposition, now often accepted 
uncritically, that§ 1983 does not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies under any circumstances. This .far-
re~ch~ng conclusion was arrived at largelywithout the be?efit of 
briefing and argument. See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 
U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.So 639 (1968); 
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). I consider the 
posture of §§1981 and 1982 in the jurisprudence of this Court 
to be quite different from that of§ 1981. 
- - 2. 
in the Court's opinion, I merely cite them: Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 (1975), 
an opinion in which I joined; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-440 (1973), another 
opinion in which I joined; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
396 U.S. 229, 325-237 (1969); and particularly and primarily, 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968). 
Although the latter two cases involved§ 1982, rather than 
§ 1981, I agree that their considered holdings with respect 
to the purpose and meaning of§ 1982 necessarily apply to 
both statutes in view of their common derivation. 
Although the range of consequences suggested by the 
dissenting opinion, post, at __ - __ , go far beyond what 
we hold today, I am concerned that our decision not be 
construed more broadly than would be justified. 
By its terms§ 1981 necessarily imposes some 
restrictions on those who would refuse to extend to Negroes 
"the same rights to make and enforce contracts .•. as 
[are] enjoyed by white citizens." But our holding that 
this restriction extends to certain actions by private 
individuals does not imply the intrusive investigation into 
the motives of every refusal to contract by a private citizen 
that is suggested by the dissent. As the court of appeals 
suggested, some contracts are so personal "as to have a 
- -
discernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to 
§ 1981." __ F.2d, at 
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra, we were 
were faced with an association in which "[t]here was no 
plan or purpose of exclusiveness." Participation was 
"open to every white person within the geographic area, 
3. 
there being no selective element other than race." 396 U.S., 
at 236. See also Tillman v. Wheaton -Haven Recreation Ass'n, 
supra, at 438. In certain personal contractual relationships, 
however, such as those where the offeror selects those with 
whom he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or 
where the contract is the foundation of a close association 
(such as, for example, that between an employer and a private 
tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper), there is reason to assume 
that, although the choice made by the offeror is selective, 
it reflects "a purpose of exclusiveness" other than the 
/ 
desire to bar members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, 
certainly in most cases, would invoke associational rights 
long respected. 
The case presented on the record before us does not 
involve this type of personal contractual relationship. As 
the court of appeals said, the petitioning "schools are 
private only in the sense that they are managed by private 
persons and they are not direct recipients of public funds. 
- -
Their actual and potential constituency, however, is more 
public than private." __ F. 2d, at __ I • The schools 
I 
extended a public offer open, on its face, to any child 
I 
4. 
meeting certain minimum qualifications l who chose to accept. 
They advertised in the "yellow" pages of the telephone 
directories and engaged extensively in l general mail 
solicitations to attract students. The schools are operated 
I 
strictly on a commercial basis, and one fairly could construe 
their open-ended invitations as offers that matured into 
I 
binding contracts when accepted by those who met the academic, 
financial, and other racially neutral specified conditions 
as to qualifications for entrance. There is•no reason to 
assume that the schools had any special reason for 
exercising an option of personal choice among those who 
re~ponded to their public offers. A small kindergarten or 
music class)operated on the basis of personal invitations 
extended to a limited number of pre-identified students, 
for example, would present a far different case. 
I do not suggest that a "bright line" can be drawn 
that easily separates the type of contract offer within 
the reach of§ 1981 from the type without. The case before 
us is clearly on one side of the line, however defined, 
and the kindergarten and music school examples are clearly 
on the other side. Close questions undoubtedly will arise 
' 
= , - -
5. 
in the grey area that necessarily exists in between. But 
some of the applicable principles and considerations, for 
the most part identified by the Court's opinion, are clear: 
Section 1981, as interpreted by our prior decisions, does 
reach certain acts of racial discrimination that are "private" 
in the sense that they involve no state action. But choices, 
including those involved in entering into a contract, that 
are "private" in the sense that they are not part of a 
commercial relationship offered generally or widely, and 
that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual 
entering into a personal relationship,certainly were never 
intended to be restricted by the Nineteenth Century Civil 
Rights Acts. The open offer to the public generally involved 
in the case before us is simply not a "private" contract in 
this sense. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court. 
. .,,.-A -. - -~UN 1 1976 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring, ___________ ~ ~.._A,, -:/-
If the slate were clean I ~~be inclined to agree .rr ~-• 
with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that§ 1981 was not intended to 
restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review 
of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his 
dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me,. 
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The applicability of § 1981 to private contracts has 
been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel 
free to disregard these precedents.* As they are reviewed 
in the Court's opinion, I merely cite them : Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 459-460 
(1975), an opinion in which I joined; Tillman v. Whea-
ton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U. S. 431, 439-440 
( 1973), another opinion in which I joined; Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 32~-327 (1969); and 
particularly and primarily, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968). Although the latter two 
cases involved § 1982, rather than § 1981, I agree that 
their considered holdings with respect to the purpose and 
meaning of § 1982 necessarily apply to both statutes in 
view of their common derivation. 
Although the range of consequences suggested by the 
dissenting opinion, post, at - - .-, go far beyond what 
we hold today, I am concerned that our decision not be 
construed more broadly than would be justified. 
By its terms § 1981 necessarily imposes some restric-
tions on those who would refuse to extend to Negroes 
"the same rights to make and enforce contracts ... as 
[are] enjoyed by white citizens." But our holding that 
this restriction extends to certain actions by private in-
dividuals does not imply the intrusive investigation into 
the motives of every refusal to contract by a private citi-
*In some instances the Court has drifted almost accidentally into 
rather extreme interpretations of the post-Civil War Acts. The 
most striking example is the proposition, now often accepted un-
critically, that § 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies under any circumstances . This far-reaching conclusion was 
11,rrived at largely without the benefit of briefing and argument. See, 
e. g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. 
Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968) ; Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416: 
(1967). I consider the posture of §§ 1981 and 1982 in the juris- ~ 
prudence Qf this Court to be quite d.i.fferent from that of § 19se--
r ~• _..,.. .,, .... - -
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,ien that is suggested by the Ai'sent. As the Court of ~ 
Appeals suggested, some contracts are so personal "as to 
have a discernible rl!-le of exclusivity which is inoffensive 
to § 1981." - F . 2d, ~t - . 
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra, we were 
faced with an association in which " [ t] here was no plan 
or purpose of exclusiveness." Participation was "open 
to every white person within the geographic area, there 
being no selective .element other than race." 396 U. S., 
at 236. See also _Tillman ·v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation 
_ Assn., supra, at 438. In certain personal contractual re-
lationships, however, -such as those where the offeror se-
lects those with whom he desires to bargain on an in-
dividualized basis, or where the contract is the founda-
tion of a close association (such as, for example, that 
between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or 
housekeeper), there is reason to assume that, although 
the choice made by the offeror is selective, it reflects "a 
purpose of exclusiveness" other than the desire to bar 
members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, certainly 
in most cases, would invoke associational rights long 
respected. 
The case presented on the record before us does not 
involve this type of personal contractual relationship_ 
As the Court of Appeals said, the petitioning "schools are 
private only in the sense that they are managed by 
private persons and they are not direct recipients of pub-
lic funds. Their actual and potential constituency, 
however, is more public than private." - F. 2d, at-. 
The schools extended a public offer open, on its face, to 
any child meeting certain minimum qualifications who• 
chose to accept. They advertised in the "yellow" pages 
of the telephone directories and engaged extensively in 
general mail solicitations to attract students. The 
s.chools , are operated sJrictly on_ a commercial basis, and'. 
-, -· --1, • -
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one fairly could construe their open-end invitations as 
offers that matured into binding contracts when accepted 
by those who met the academic, financial, and other 
racially neutral specified conditions as to qualifications 
for entrance. There is no reason to assume that the 
schools had any special reason for exercising an option of 
personal choice among those who responded to their 
public offers. A small kindergarten or music class, op-
erated on the basis of personal invitations extended to a 
limited number of preidentified students, for example, 
would present a far different case. 
I do not suggest that a "bright line" can be drawn that 
easily separates the type of contract offer within , the 
reach of § 1981 from the type without. The case before 
us is clearly on one side of the line, however defined, and 
the kindergarten and music school examples are clearly 
on the other side. Close questions undoubtedly will arise 
in the grey area that necessarily exists in between. But 
some of the applicable principles and considerations, for 
the most part identified by the Court's opinion, are 
clear: Section 1981, as interpreted by our prior decisions, 
does reach certain acts of racial discrimination that are 
"private" in the sense that they involve no state action. 
But choices, including those involved in entering into a 
contract, that are "private" in the sense that they are 
not part of a commercial relationship offered generally 
or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an 
individual entering into a personal relationship, certainly 
were never intended to be restricted by the Nineteenth 
Century Civil Rights Acts. The open offer to the public 
generally involved in the case before us is simply not a 
"private" contract in this sense. Accor.dingly, I join:. - -
the opinion of the Cour:t_. 
• $>tqrrttttt Q!ourl of 14, /ilniltb ~tts 
~aglrhtgfott, g). <!}. 2.cJffeJ.I.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June✓6 
Re: No. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306 - Runyon v. McCrary 
Dear Potter: 
These cases are not the easiest ones for me , for you know 
my concern about the statutory analysis in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co. Nevertheless, I regard that case as past history now, and I 
feel that I gave full emphasis and sympathetic attention to it in my 
opinions in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency and Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n. I agree with Lewis when he 
points out that Byron's dissent contains much that is persuasive. 
On the other hand, I a lso agree that with Jones, Tillman, and John-
son , we round e d that corner long since. 
Therefore, please j oin me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
J~ ---
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
- • ~ttµrmtt <!Jonrl 1tf lqt ~~ ~taftg 
~ IU'flpng-htn, ~- QJ. 20ffe~, 
June 21, 1976 
Re: (75-62 - Runyon v. McCrary 
(75-66 - Fairfax-Brewster v. Gonz ale z 
( 7 5 - 2 7 8 - So . Ind. Sch. A s soc . v. Mc C r a r y 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- e 
.§u:p-t"tmt <!}cud of tlft ~nitth .§tattg 
'Jl'aglp:ttghttt. ~. Q}. 2llffe)l.' 
June 22, 1976 
Re: Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278 and 75-306 
Runyon v. Mc Crary 
Dear Chief, 
The opinion in these cases cannot 
be announced on Friday. Byron's dissenting 
opinion refers to McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Trans. Co. (No. 75-260), and that case for 
some reason is not yet ready-for announcement. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
.§nputttt Q}o-url o-f Hr~ ~ttlt j;tattg 
,.-w.rfrmghtn. ~- Q}. 2.llffeJ!~ 
June 22, 1976 
Re: 75-62 - Runyon v. Mccrary 
✓ 
75-66 - Fairfax-Brewster v. Gonzalez 
75-278 - So. Ind. Sch. Assn. v. Mccrary 
75-306 - Mccrary v. Runyon 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
Jl. 
- I I 
e,. 
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CERTIORARI TO THE l'KITED STATES COl.RT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FOl"RTH CIRCl"IT 
;\O. i5-62. A.rgued April 26, 19i 6-Decided Ju ne 25 , 19i6* 
MR. J u sTICE POWELL, concurring. 
If the slate were clean I might well be inclined to agree 
with MR. J USTICE WHITE that§ 1981 was not intended to 
restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review 
of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his 
dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me, 
however, that it comes too late. 
The applicability of § 1981 to private contracts has 
been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel 
free to disregard these precedents.• As they are reviewed 
in the Court's opinion, I merely cite them: Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459--160 (1975) , 
an opinion in which I joined ; Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven R ecreation Assn. , 410 U. S. 431 , 439-440 (1973) , 
another opinion in which I joined ; Sullivan v. Little 
Hunt ing Park, Inc ., 396 F S. 229, 236-237 (1969) ; and 
particularly and primarily, Jones Y. Alfred H . Mayer 
-~In some instances the Court has drifted almost accidentalh· into 
rath~ ext reme interpretations of the post-CiYi l \\"ar Act.s .· The 
most striking example -ii the proposition , now often accepted un-
critically, that 42 V. S. C . § 1983 dO<'s not require exh:i.ustion of 
administ-ra tiYe remedi C's under any circurnst.'.lilces. This far-reaching 
condu~ion was a rri\·ed at largely without t-hc brnefit. oi briefing and 
argument . S('{', r . g., lri/1co rdi11g ,·. S1Cen.so11 . 404 l: . S. 249 (1971) ; 
Hought on \" . Shafer, 392 U . S. 639 ( 1965) : Damico \" . California, 389 
LS. -!J G (1 96i ). I consider thr posture of§§ 1% 1 and 19S2 in thf' 
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Co., 392 r. ~-409. 420-43i (1968 ) . Although the latter 
two cases inrnlwd ~ 1982, rather than § 1981. I agree 
that their considered holdings with respect to the purpose 
and meaning of ~ 1982 necessarily apply to both statutes 
in vie\\· of their common deriYation. ....__ 
:\)though the range of consequences suggested by the 
dissenting opinion. post, at 212 , goes far beyond what 
we hold today, I am concerned that our decision not be 
construed more broadly than would be justified. 
By its terms § 1981 necessarily imposes some restric-
tions on those who would refuse to extend to Xegroes 
"the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... 
as is enjoyed by white citizens.·· But our holding that 
this restriction extends to certain actions by prirnte in -
dividuals does not imply the intrusive investigation into 
the motiYes of e\·ery refusal to contract by a priYate citi-
zen that is suggested by the dissent. As the Court of 
Appeals suggested , some contracts are so personal "as to 
haYe a discernible rule of exclusiYity which is inoffensi\'e 
to § 1981. ' ' 515 F. 2d 1082. 1088 (1975). 
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra, we \\·ere 
faced \\·ith an association in which "[t]here was no plan 
or purpose of exclusiveness." Participation was "open 
to ewry white person within the geographic area. there 
being no selective element other than race." 396 r. S. , 
at 236. See also Tillman Y. Wheaton-Haven Recreation 
Assn. , supra, at 438. In certain personal contractual re-
lationships. howewr ,such as those "·here the offeror se-
lects those with " ·horn he desires to bargain on an in-
dividualized basis. or where the contract is the founda-
tion of a close association (such as. for example. that 
between an employer and a priYate tutor. babysitter . or 
housekeeper). there is reason to assume that, although 
the choice made by the offeror is selective. it reflects "a 
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members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, certainly 
in most cases. would invoke associational rights long 
respected. 
The case presented on the record before us does not 
involve this type of personal contractual relationship . 
. .\s the Court of Appeals sa.id , the petitioning "schools are 
private only in the sense that they are managed by 
private persons and they are not direct recipients of pub-
lic funds. Their actual and potential constituency, 
however, is more public than private." 515 F . 2d, at 
1089. The schools extended a public off er open, on its 
face , to any child meeting certain minimum qualifications 
"·ho chose to accept. They advertised in the "Yellow 
Pages" of the telephone directories and engaged exten-
siYely in general mail solicitations to attract students. 
The schools are operated strictly on a commercial basis. 
and one fairly could construe their open-end im·itations 
as offers that matured into binding contracts when ac-
cepted by those who met the academic, fu1a.ncial , and 
other racially neutral specified conditions as to qualifica-
tions for entrance. Then• is no reason to assume that 
the schools had any special rea..."°n for exercising an op-
tion of personal choice among those who responded to 
their public offers. A small kindergarten or music class, 
operated on the basis of personal im·itations extended to 
a limited number of preidentified students. for example, 
would present a far different case. 
..._, I do not suggest that a "bright line" can be drawn that 
easily separates the type of contract offer within the 
reach of § 1981 fr0.p1 the type without. The case before 
us is clearly on one side of the line, howeYer defined. and 
the kindergarten and music school examples are clearly 
on the other side. Close questions undoubtedly will arise 
in the gray area that necessarily exists in between . But 
some of the applicable principles and considerations. for 
the most part identified by the Court's opm10n, are 
- -
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clear: § 1981. as interpreted by our prior decisions, does 
reach certain acts of racial discrimination that are 
"private" in the sense that they im·olve no state action . 
But choices. including those invol\'ed in entering into a 
contract, that are "pri\·ate ., in the sense that they are 
not part of a commercial relationship offered generally 
or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by afl_ 
indi\·idual entering into a personal relationship, certainly 
were ne\'er intended to be restricted by the 19th cen-
tury Ci\'il Rights . .\cts. The open offer to the public 
generally im·oh·ed in the cases before us is simply not a 
"prirnte" contract in this sense. Accordingly, I join 
the opinion of the Court. 
...... 
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